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Economic freedom in Muslim countries: an explanation using the theory of institutional 
path dependency 
 
Abstract. This article explains the level of economic freedom in Muslim countries through the theory of 
institutional path dependency. Islamic countries are generally not free and they have a poor record regarding 
property rights. To explain these realities we use the institutional history of Muslim countries. We define three 
steps: the Arab and Ottoman Empires when Islamic law was of great importance, European colonisation, and the 
contemporary era with its movement towards a revival of Islam. Islamic law is not liberal. This explains why, in 
general, Muslim countries are generally not free. Colonisation radically changed institutional life in the twentieth 
century. British colonisation proved to be better than did French or Soviet colonisation. This explains why the 
Persian Gulf countries are freer. The collapse of the Soviet model explains the speed of liberalisation in former 
socialist countries (such as Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan). Nevertheless, the twentieth century was 
not just the century of Westernisation. It was also the century of the revival of Islam. The article concludes that 
the history of the twentieth century does not explain the way in which Muslim countries are attracted by the ideal 
of the Muslim city. The revival of Islamic intellectual innovations and the evolution of Muslim opinion sustain 
this thesis. Therefore, there is a dependency on the past and on an imagined future. Islam acts, like yesterday, on 
the world of institutional possibilities. 
 
Keywords Economic freedom, colonisation, imaginary, Islam, property rights 
JEL: KOO, N23. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The objective of this article is to explain the relationship between Muslim countries and 
economic liberalism. Like all the econometric literature about economic freedom and GDP 
growth (European Journal Political Economy, 2003, Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe, 
1999, de Vanssay and Spindler, 1994, Spindler, 1991, Scully, 1988) that evaluates this 
relationship one can refer to the indexes of economic freedom proposed by American non-
profit organisations: Fraser or Heritage. In the 2009 report of the Index of Economic Freedom 
(www.heritage.org), we learn that North America and Europe enjoy far greater levels of 
economic freedom than do those who live in other regions of the world. On this indicator, 
Muslim countries are 'less free'. In addition, there are differences among Muslim countries: 
Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, UAE, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Turkey, and Kazakhstan are described as 'moderately free' and Bahrain is 'fairly free'. But 
what determines these divergent models of economic freedom between West and East and 
more generally among Muslim countries? 
 
To answer at this question, we use the contribution of new institutional economics (NIE). NIE 
is a combination of theories from different traditions (Brousseau and Glachant, 2008). NIE 
focuses on the belief that humans develop to explain their environment and the institutions 
(political, economic, and social) that they create to shape that environment (North, 2005, p. 
11). From this perspective, we connect the contributions of Austrian economics and North to 
explain institutional design and its change. The contribution of Austrian theory is to award a 
place to tacit knowledge acquired by the actors by abstract rules and transmitted throughout 
organic institutions. For this reason, capitalism by fiat, according to Pejovich (2008), would 
be doomed to failure because humans must have confidence in these institutions. They must 
believe that they are just; the feeling of injustice makes the graft of institutions of economic 
freedom inefficient. If the ruling elite anticipate this effect, they block reforms because they 
anticipate that they will fail. The people thereby do not share free market ethics, and the free 
market would not, under these conditions, have the effect it might in a more favourable ethical 
environment. The status quo is not only connected to political calculations of the elite of 
interest groups. It has also its origins in people‟s values. In these conditions, cultural change 
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or indigenously introduced endogenous institutions (Boettke, Coyne and Leeson, 2008, p. 
337) is a prerequisite to the implementation of institutions favourable to economic growth 
(respect of economic freedom). Therefore, the institutional design of each country is 
determined by its ethic path dependency. 
 
The past connects with the present and future to create the path dependency (North, 1990, pp. 
92–94, 2005, p. 2) of the institutional structure, i.e. “the combination of formal rules informal 
constraints, and their enforcement characteristics” (North, 2005, p. 6). Institutions are hard to 
change and they have tremendous effects on the possibilities for generating sustained 
economic growth (Pierson, 2000, p. 256). Then, the institution structure imposes severe 
constraints on the choice set of entrepreneurs when they seek to innovate or modify 
institutions (North, 2005, p. 2). The underdevelopment of the Muslim world can explain these 
path dependencies, which tend to lock in particular institutional arrangements. This article 
applies this model to explain the low level of economic freedom in the Muslim world and the 
differences among countries. In the long-term, this explains the limited convergence of 
economic performance across countries over time and the continued divergence in GDP per 
capita between West and East. 
 
The empirical issue of the article is to apply this theory of institutional path dependency to 
explain the level of economic freedom in the Muslim world. As Sutcliffe (1975), Kuran 
(2004b, pp. 71–72), or Hillman (2007) explain, the Muslim world is poor and underdeveloped 
today as a result of certain Islamic institutions (Islamic egalitarian inheritance system, absence 
of the concepts of limited liability and Waqf), which have had the unintended effect of being 
obstacles to economic development. This article assesses the history of Islamic Law to 
explain why, on the one hand, the Muslim world is not free, and, on the other hand, economic 
freedom does not exist in Muslim culture. East and West, to simplify, have different 
institutional structures but the same path dependence. East and West have different ethic 
roads. When the West colonised the East and other Muslims countries (in Africa and Asia) it 
developed tensions between the informal constraints of Muslim countries and Western formal 
rules. The main origin of the informal constraints in Muslim countries is religion because the 
dominant organised belief structure (North, 1997, p. 5) is Islam. In this context, Islam imposes 
specifies norms and learning processes by which a particular belief structure evolves (North, 
1997, p. 5). This learning process constrained and constrains the institutional choices of 
governments in the Muslim world. 
 
The theoretical issue is the existence of two institutional path dependencies: dependency on 
the past and addiction to the future through the imagination of institutional possibilities. 
According to North (1990, pp. 92–94, 2005, p. 52), path dependence is a factor in the 
continuity of a (Muslim) society but it is not inertia. It constrains the choice set in the present, 
which is derived from the historical experiences of the past (North, 2005, p. 52). 
 
Dependence on the past does not only affect the cost of institutional change. It also has an 
effect on the imagination, or the definition of institutional possibilities. The ideal of a Muslim 
city plays the same role as that of the ideal of classical liberalism. It inspired the Muslim right 
to enforce the institutions of capitalism. Muslims possess in their world institutional 
possibilities, the choice of Shari’a, the ideal of the Muslim city. They can imagine an Islamic 
future because they are converted to Islam. The institutional dependence path is dependent 
upon a world of possibilities. The past does not only determine the future, but also the 
imagined futures. Christian or secular countries do not integrate into their worlds the possible 
future choices of Shari’a. They do not attempt to evaluate its chances of success or its value 
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for the national community. The rules of Muslim countries and more generally the political 
forces evaluate the opportunity of such an alternative to capitalism or socialism. All Muslim 
countries, despite their differences, share this imagery because it is determined by their 
conversion to Islam. They are all different countries; their geographies, their histories, their 
populations and their geopolitical situations distinguish them but they all adhere to the project 
of the ideal Muslim city. It is this ideal that the institutional path dependency theory describes. 
 
This article explains the level of economic freedom in Muslim countries through the theory of 
institutional path dependence. The first section describes the property rights and economic 
freedom (Heritage foundation) in Muslim countries and explains why in general this area of 
civilisation is less free and why the ethic road of this area is not economic liberalism. The 
second section shows the consequences of European colonisation and political choice. These 
historical events explain the differences among Muslim countries. Colonisation radically 
changed institutional life in the twentieth century; however, British colonisation has proven to 
be better than has French or Soviet colonisation. This explains why the Persian Gulf countries 
are rather freer. Nevertheless, the twentieth century was not just the century of 
Westernisation. It was also the century of the revival of Islam. The third section discusses 
how the evolutions of economic freedom (1995–2007), the revival of Islamic intellectual 
innovations, and the evolution of Muslim opinion affected institutional evolution in the 
Muslim world. Islam acts, like yesterday, on the world of institutional possibilities. 
 
2 Why are Muslim countries less free? 
 
According to the Economic Freedom index, some Muslim countries are less free (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Economic Freedom by Region (2009) 
North 
America 
Europe South and Central 
America/Caribbean 
Middle 
East/North 
Africa
1
 
World 
Average 
Asia 
Pacific 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
2
 
75.7 66.3 60.1 60.0 59.5 57.6 53.1 
Source: Heritage foundation report 2009 (Chapter 5).  
 
The Heritage Foundation index is a simple average of ten indicators of individual freedom 
(Beach and Kane, 2008, p. 39). Each indicator measures a type of freedom such as business 
freedom, free trade, fiscal freedom, size of State, monetary freedom (stability and price 
control), freedom to invest, financial freedom, property law (security) level of corruption, and 
freedom of contracts in matters of work. Business freedom is the capacity to create, manage, 
and close a company rapidly and easily. Free trade measures the absence of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, which affects imports and exports. Fiscal freedom measures the charges the 
government applies to citizens‟ incomes. The size of government measures the freedom to 
choose the types of goods and services consumed. Monetary freedom measures price stability 
(inflation tax) and the freedom to fix prices. Freedom of investment is the facility of access 
                                                 
1
 Middle East/North African Countries: Bahrain, Israel, (score 67.6) Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, Syria, Iran, Libya, Iraq. 
2
 Sub-Saharan African countries: Mauritius, Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, Namibia, Madagascar, Cape 
Verde, Burkina Faso, Swaziland, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia, Senegal, Gambia, Mozambique, Mali, 
Benin, Nigeria, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, Mauritania, Niger, Malawi, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Lesotho, Burundi, Togo, Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Seychelles, Chad, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Rep. Of Congo, Sâo Tomé and Principe, Comoros, Dem Rep of 
Congo, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Sudan. 
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capital, more particularly foreign capital. Financial freedom measures banking security and 
independence in relation to government. Public ownership of banks and financial institutions 
is contrary to financial freedom. Ownership rights measure individual capacity to accumulate 
property rights without it being threatened by the state (Table 2). Furthermore, the level of 
corruption measures the equality of individuals before the law. Freedom on the employment 
market evaluates contractual freedom. Each of these indicators has an equal weight. This list 
moderates the pertinence of global indicators when evaluating the effect of economic freedom 
on economic growth.  
 
Table 2 
Property Freedom (average) and Religion (2009) 
Protestant Catholic 
Western 
Europe 
Catholic 
Eastern 
and 
Central 
Europe 
No 
majority 
Orthodox Buddhist Islam 
Arab 
Ex 
USSR 
Black 
African 
Catholic 
Black 
African 
Muslim 
84.5 76.3 59.5 44.4 39.1 38.5 38.1 23.3 37.27 26.7 
Sources: Heritage foundation report, author‟s calculation of averages. Property Freedom. 
 
If we follow the perspective opened by the theory of institutional path dependencies, one can 
find the explanation for low average indicators of economic freedom in the Muslim world and 
its diversity across countries by studying the institutional trajectory of each country (Table 4). 
History, from this perspective, is important because the sequence of events determines current 
values (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995, p. 223). The sequence is pre-Islamic, Islamic, 
Ottoman, colonisation, and independence. The formal institutions of these countries are 
different from other countries because, on the one hand, the sequence was different, and, on 
the other hand, Muslims possess in their world of institutional possibilities the choice of 
Shari’a. Christian or secular countries do not integrate into their worlds the possible future 
choices of Shari’a.  
 
Islamic law differs in many aspects to the ideal of liberal order. It justifies an economic model 
of rent. This does not mean that Islamic law is the only legal tradition that is unfavourable to 
economic liberalism. Cultural factors, with political will, interest group action, and political 
decisions, explain why Muslim countries are generally less free. This creates an ethical 
context that is unfavourable to liberalisation. This first section of this chapter defines briefly 
the history of Islamic law (2.1), explains why its ideal is not liberal from a modern viewpoint 
(2.2), and describes how this ideal justified the rent models of Arab and Ottoman empires 
(2.3). 
 
2.1 Islamic Law 
 
If we follow the theory of institutional path dependency, Islamic law explains a part of 
institutional reality today. Islamic law is derived from an interpretation of sacred texts 
revealed to the Prophet by God (Coulson, 1995, Montgomery Watt, 1968, Schacht, 1964, 
Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, 2006). It commenced around AD 609–632 in the Arabian Peninsula 
with the Prophet‟s revelations. The four main sources of Muslim law are the Koran, the 
Sunnah, the Idjma and the Kiyas or Akl (Scully, 1987, Sait and Lim, 2006, Aldeeb Abu-
Sahlieh, 2006). The Koran is the first source of Muslim law. It is the sacred book of Muslims. 
This text is the word of God revealed to the Prophet. The Prophet is he who reveals 
information that originates from a beneficial (Allah) or evil (the devil) source (Aldeeb Abu-
Sahlieh, 2006, p. 60). The Sunnah is the tradition or the precedents of Islam. It is transmitted 
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from generation to generation by Muslims among themselves. The Shiites reject the Sunnah 
companions of the Prophet but accept the Sunnah people of the house of the Prophet as a 
source of law (Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, 2006, pp. 123–128). The Idjma is a body of doctrine or 
practices universally accepted by Muslims. The Kiyas is the result of jurists‟ logical analogue 
reduction on the origin of the law for Sunnites (not for Shiites). 
 
The role of Islamic law in Muslim societies is the subject of contentious debate among 
Muslims (Brown, 1997, p. 359). There are two positions. For the first, Islamic Law is a right 
without practice (Brunschvig, 1976, p. 119, Denoix, 1996, p. 11). The nature of Islamic law is 
largely determined by its history and this history is dominated by the contrast between theory 
and practice (Schacht, 1964, p. 165). For the second, Islamic Law dominates the practice and 
unifies the Muslim world around the same system of rule. The laws and customs of the 
conquered countries were gradually integrated into Islamic law, over the years, through the 
practice of fiqh. The fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence. It is an expansion of Islamic Law and gives 
the impression of juridical unity in the Muslim world (Denoix, 1996, Tyan, 1977). The 
Muslim world shares this juridical practice, this same reference of Islamic law, as well as an 
ideal of society. This ideal and this practice have influenced the world of the institutional 
possibilities of the people of these countries and helps explain why Muslim countries are less 
free. 
 
2.2. Islamic Law and Free Market Ideal 
 
One characteristic of Islamic law that differs from the capitalist ideal is that it considers 
sacred a certain number of inequalities (Section 2.2.1), restricts the freedom of ownership on 
moral principles (Section 2.2.2), and promotes the collective ownership of natural resources 
(Section 2.2.3) and ruling over spoils (Section 2.2.4). Islamic law founds and justifies formal 
institutions that contrast with free market institutions, which legitimise a culture of rent 
(2.2.5) (Al Jabri, 2007, Hillman and Ursprung, 2000). 
 
2.2.1 Unequal property 
 
The protection of property is pronounced in Islamic law (Schacht 1964, p. 118), but it does 
not guarantee the formal equality of citizens before the law. From a general point of view, 
Islamic law recognises human, public, and private rights (Khadduri, 1946, pp. 77–78, 
Habachy, 1962). The first difference between the West and East concerns the basis of 
ownership. The West bases ownership on a secular basis, while the East uses religious bases 
(Habachy, 1962, p. 453). All human rights are God‟s privilege, as all authority comes from 
God. God is, according to this theory, indirectly at the head of the Islamic state (Khadduri, 
1946, p. 79). God dictates the law through the words of the Prophet. Human rights are the 
privilege of those who have full legal capacity. A man has full legal capacity if he is an adult, 
free, and of Muslim faith. It follows from this principle that non-Muslims and slaves who live 
in an Islamic state have rights that are only partly protected (Khadduri, 1946, p. 79). It is the 
case in the most societies. “Human persons are seen as being able to be holders of property 
relationship. But usually such capacity is constructed with the help of qualifiers. On the basis 
of criteria of gender, age, mental state, or social status, certain persons may be deemed to be 
incapable of holding property of their own” (Von Benda-Beckmann, 1995, p. 313). Islamic 
law sanctifies three formal inequalities (Voigt, 2005, p. 65): master–slave relationships, which 
define the concept of freedom in Muslim society (Montgomery-Watt, 1968, p. 113, Lewis, 
2005, pp. 919–933), male–female relationships, and relations between believers and non-
believers. 
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2.2.2 Restricted ownership 
 
Islamic law, secondly, does not give the owner free use of his or her property. The owner is 
forced to accept moral rules that apply to everyone. He or she has obligations towards the 
community as this is God‟s precept, in exchange for which he or she can exercise rights of 
private use over these possessions (Gardet, 1930, p. 112). Ownership does not come first. It 
depends upon superior moral principles, which include the submission of man to God and His 
principles. These principles restrain ownership rights in several ways. Individual freedom, 
otherwise stated as the use of one‟s property, is limited by the prohibition of use, obligation to 
pay tax for the poor (Zakat), succession rights, the absence of a legal entity, collective lands, 
the higher right of the state to the land, and the prohibition to appropriate water and grass for 
oneself. All these restrictions are the origins of institutions, which are distinct from free 
market institutions. 
(1) In ancient times, loans with interest, financial trading, and the rental of capital were 
formally condemned by Islamic law. However, Muslim jurists quickly found solutions to get 
around the law and resort to credit. Rather than lend money to buy a house, the bank bought 
the house and rented it. The result of this prohibition harmed the development of a capitalist 
banking and financial system in the East. 
(2) Zakat (Sura 21, v. 73) justifies redistribution. 
(3) Succession rules in favour of the non-division of Muslim land, namely judicial 
situations where at least two persons have common title to the same nature exercised on the 
same property or set of properties without there being material division of their shares. This 
also covers insecurity for non-Muslim lands. Non-division limits the concentration of wealth. 
More generally, it threatens the succession of companies and all capital of one generation to 
another (Kuran, 2004a). This has the effect of applying the civil code to land division in 
France. Muslim succession rights fragmented fortunes and had the unintentional effect of 
limiting innovation (Kuran, 2003, 2004b, p. 75). This reinforced the effect of the absence of 
legal entity on the dynamics of land accumulation in Muslim lands. 
 (4) The absence of legal entity prevented the emergence of collective enterprises that 
had legal rights distinct from those of individuals who finance them (corporations). Kuran 
(1995) thereby explains why the finances of the Middle East before AD 1000 were made 
without banks and without a credit market in the modern sense of the term. The incertitude 
about the legitimacy of interest and the lack of corporate law led to contracts where borrowers 
and lenders were individuals (Kuran, 1995, 2004b, p. 73). This also had the effect of limiting 
investment, innovation, and growth. The rigidity of Muslim law prevented the countries 
submitted to it from developing large-scale enterprises capable of exploiting scale economies 
and developing new technology. 
 
2.2.3 Collective ownership of natural resources  
 
Islamic law legitimises, thirdly, the public and common ownership of land
3
, which were the 
most common forms of ownership in Arab and Ottoman Empires. It prevents the privatisation 
and realisation of liberal order where individual rights are exclusive and transferable. The 
basic rules were the nationalisation and inalienability of land. It is Omar and not the Prophet 
that is behind this system. Omar resumed by this practice the old principles of collective tribal 
ownership. There is, on this topic, a continuum between pre-Islamic traditions and Islam (de 
Planhol, 1968, p. 54). In Islamic law, there are several types of land ownership: state property, 
                                                 
3
 See Sylvie Denoix, special number of Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, Année 1996, 
volume 79, Nr 1, dedicated to “Biens Communs, patrimoines collectifs et gestion communautaire dans les 
sociétés Musulmanes”. 
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the ownership of conquering Arabs and non-Arabs, the ownership of non-Muslims, the 
ownership of religious institutions (Waqf), and collective property (Linant de Bellefonds, 
1959, p. 121, Denoix, 1996). We can distinguish, also, private appropriation (milk), collective 
appropriation (gamâe), the commons, and public property. We find these forms of ownership 
in the Ottoman Empire (Bozarslan, 1988). The Ottoman Empire also possessed a mosaic of 
property ownership: Miri, Jiftlik, Mahlul, Matruka, Mawat, Waqf Mulk, and Musha. They 
were private or public (Miri, Jiftlik). Only Mulk was similar to Western ownership, which was 
private property owned in complete freehold. The land could be transferred to others without 
state interference, and owners could mortgage it or bequeath it. Such ownership was rare in 
many countries.  
Miri and Jiftlik, on the contrary, were perhaps the most common form of land 
ownership. Individuals could purchase a deed to cultivate this land and play a tithe to the 
government plus an additional tax. Jiftlik was land that had been bequeathed to the Sultan by 
its owners. It could be rented out directly to tenants. These State properties were built during 
the first caliphate of land possessed by the warriors who fought Islam. The Caliph had the 
right to appropriate one fifth of the spoils after a conquest, the occupied land.  
Matruka was, also, public ownership. It was land set aside for public use such as 
highways. Mawat was land that was declared unsuitable for any purpose, generally desert or 
swamp. The existence of a collective or common property, the extent of which was difficult to 
determine in remote times and sometimes even today, is explained by two main hadîths
4
, the 
third being of lesser magnitude (Linant de Bellefonds 1959, p. 121). The non-appropriable 
nature of land results not from its own nature (as there exist private pastures and appropriated 
forests) but from the principle consecrated by the Sunna that some things are a gift from God 
to which consequently everyone has an equal right (Linant de Bellefonds, 1959, p. 123). 
These lands permanently became common res. They can no longer be anyone‟s property. 
Inevitably, the common res represent a risk to the of destruction of natural pastures or forest 
patrimony (Linant de Bellefonds, 1959, p. 114). This tragedy of common pasture exists for all 
natural resources: common land, water, grass, and fire, as well as deposits of asphalt or salt. 
 To conclude Waqf was the lands given to religious and charitable institutions. In pre-
commercial society, Waqf would ordinarily be arable land, farms, or oases. Waqf is a religious 
endowment or the public body that manages the endowment in some cases. It may be a land 
or trust investment or any other kind of property. The basic regulations governing Waqf trusts 
are laid down in Shari'a. These lands were exonerated partially or totally from taxation. Their 
incomes may finance mosques, religious institutions, or charities. Waqf with Miri was one of 
the legal modes of land ownership prevalent in the Ottoman Empire. For some observers, 
Waqf was at the origin of behaviour that was unfavourable to the economic development of 
countries in the Muslim area (Shatzmiller, 2001, Cahen, 1961, Kuran, 2004b, pp. 71–72). 
Economists rapidly condemned immobilisation for the perpetuity of vast expanses of land, 
which excluded them from the market and represented mortmain property (Coulson, 1995, p. 
190). 
 
2.2.4 Acquiring property with spoils 
 
Contrary to liberal traditions, a man can acquire property by conquest and spoils. "That which 
God gives to his messenger as spoils collected at the cost of the inhabitants of the cities 
belongs to God and his messenger, to those close to him, to orphans, to the poor, the traveller 
so that the remains are not shared only among the rich among you" (Sura 8 Koran). These 
spoils do not essentially concern personal effects. It also allows the appropriation of property 
                                                 
4
 The hadîths are texts that retrace the words or acts of Mohammed and are generally referred to as the Sunna 
(“tradition”). 
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such as land (Linant de Bellefonds, 1959, p. 121, Denoix, 1996, Facchini, 2010). Muslim law 
produced a doctrinal link between spoils and war, which is generally associated with the 
concept of Jihad. The word Jihad means "effort to achieve an objective" and this objective is 
to assure God‟s reign. Jihad is both an internal combat for each Muslim to attain holiness and 
a combat against the enemies of Islam. Combating enemies of Islam justifies the spoils; it is 
the reward for conversion work that enables the conquest and the submission of non-believers 
to Muslim authority. Conquest and spoils are not sought for themselves but to convert the 
people and found a new state, legitimised by a new religion (Islam) (Al Jabri, 2007, p. 89). 
During this Meccan period, the success of Islam can be explained both by meeting the interest 
of urban dwellers and Bedouins (de Planhol, 1967) and the place to which the new religion 
gave the spoils and conquest (Al Jabri, 2007). On the death of the Prophet, Abu Bakr and 
Omar had probably used this spirit of conquest to maintain the unity between Bedouins and 
urban people (Montgomery Watt, 1956, de Planhol, 1968, pp. 28–29). Spoil is the emblem of 
this economy based on the raids and an unequal distribution of wealth. Islam legitimises 
conquests and founds the economic model of the predation of Arab and Turk models. The 
result is that “in Islamic societies, wealth and power have historically been concentrated in 
the hands of an absolute ruler and associated elites” (Hillman, 2007, p. 271). The proof is 
that since the rise of Islam in the seventh century, various dynasties have come to power 
including the Umayyads, Abbasids, Mamluks, Safavids, and the Ottomans. The Arab and 
Ottoman Empires never operated based on liberal capitalism. Muslim rights legitimise a rent-
seeking model. 
 
2.3 Islamic Law and the Rent-seeking Model 
 
Many works have described this rent-seeking model (Cheddadi, 1980, Chapra, 2007, 
Bozarslan, 1988, Carré, 1983, 1986, Al Jabri, 2007, Hillman, 2007). Like Russia (Hedlund, 
2005) Islamic Law creating a virtual past. It provided the rulers with a religious myth that 
justified their claim for absolute control over all aspects of social life. The prosperity of the 
Arab and Ottoman Empires was based on military expansion and a religious state. Wars had 
two objectives: to expand the territory and to pillage it. War was in fact a war of colonisation. 
The central power was imposed on the Turks in order to implant themselves in new colonies 
to create unity. 
 
Ibn Khaldûn‟s description of power in Islam shows clearly that the Empire‟s economic model 
is mercantile where wealth and law are associated with holding power (Cheddadi, 1980, p. 
535). He who holds the power distributes the spoils. Khaldûn considers Islamic power based 
on the notion of Jah. Jah is the capacity of men to exercise their will over those who are their 
subjects. It is a social condition of exercising constraint that is considered necessary for life in 
society (Cheddadi, 1980, p. 536). Jah has two functions. Social well-being is a necessary 
function, whereas exploiting the work of others is an accidental function. Jah is thereby 
presented as a concept that competes with the concept of authority as a purely arbitrary 
function between men and the application of divine law; a concept defended by theologians 
and very present in the minds of Muslims. Jah is meant to be a positive description of the 
economic and social reality of power in Islam. However, economists show that one of the 
main sources of wealth, aside from hunting, breeding, agriculture, arts, and commerce, is the 
exercise of authority (Cheddadi, 1980, p. 544). Jah is a source of wealth because it provides 
the means to exploit the work of others. Passing from a tribal power to a central power in the 
Magreb, and before that in Makrech, under these conditions, it aims at the seizure of surplus 
by a small minority. This minority draws taxes, exploits the work of others, and usurps 
property (Cheddadi, 1980, pp. 544–546). Jah describes a predation model. 
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Similarly, Weber upholds that if Muslim civilisation did not discover capitalism it is because 
Islam transformed its original ascetic extra-social monotheism into the military ethic. It is this 
warrior ethic – and the patrimonial structures and prebend determined by it – that hindered the 
rise of the state‟s spirit of capitalism (Carré, 1986, p. 141). Turner (1974) developed this 
thesis by explaining the way in which Medina society was structured with warriors and 
mystics. Such a world leaves little room for production as man either prays to God or makes 
war in God‟s name. War also allowed the raising of taxes. 
 
The spending of taxes was the origin of the merchants' wealth in towns. The powerful (Arabs 
and then Turks) administered the Empire and took the dividends. Muslim Arabs occupied 
territories by placing garrisons in the cities and differentiated between Muslim and non-
Muslim taxation. They established separate camps, living off the fruits of their conquests and 
the taxes paid by non-Muslims in exchange for their freedom and protection. They thus 
organised life for believers and non-believers. The Muslim presence became synonymous 
with the opportunity for exchange and led artists and merchants (Jews and Christians mainly) 
to offer their services. They incited some to convert in order to benefit from the same fiscal 
advantages as the believers did and others to remain Christian or Jewish in order to benefit 
from the possibility of offering services that the other beliefs could not propose (Bella, 2004)
5
 
in the garrison cities where the Arab aristocracy resided. In this context, it was in the interest 
of Muslims to protect Christians and Jews. They paid taxes and participated actively in the 
prosperity of the Turkish and Arab Empire in the Orient (Bella, 2004). The triumph of 
commerce and the wealth of merchants was based on spending spoils acquired by the nobility 
or the occupying force. This Muslim aristocracy disengaged revenues from the fiscal system 
of the land. It incarnated the power of landowners (Benabdelali, 1999, p. 183 and p. 275) who 
lived off their land revenues and imposed the values of generosity and donation, which 
predominated in society and were contrary to the diffusion of the capitalist values of frugality 
and efficiency (Benabdelali, 1999). By socially dominating the merchants, the aristocrats 
maintained a donation economy that recycled agricultural surplus and created a blooming 
urban production sector (Benabdelali, 1999, p. 307). Schematically we could say that Muslim 
law incited the Arabs to become warriors or mystics and non-believers to do business. Thus, 
the law organised these roles. 
 
The history of the rise of Islam as a civilisation illustrates the observation that the descendants 
of societies that were the first to have centralised government and organised religion ended up 
dominating the modern world. The union of government operated with its resulting fruits, 
writing and technology, as one of the four main sets of immediate elements that gave history 
its general configuration (Diamond, 1997, 2000, p. 272). The difficulty for these centralised 
regimes with a theocratic ideal based on predation revenue was to find the correct level of 
predation
6
. We then find ourselves in the configuration described by Baumol (1990) for the 
Chinese and Roman Empires. The Empires of India, China, or Germany in the Middle Ages, 
he states, collapsed because they asked too much from the producing people. This explains 
the decline and their political helplessness. For without a solid economic base, political 
authorities cannot finance armies or administrations; its military power is reduced and 
corruption within the administration results. It is because a society progressively values 
predation more than production that it declines in relation to societies that invent a better 
                                                 
5
 Bella (2004) explains the ambiguous relationship between Christians, Jews, and Muslims by the consequences 
on public finance from conversion to Islam. She upholds that the Ottoman Empire was a state respectful of free 
trade and the religions of the book because non-Muslims were the financial cornerstone of the warrior empire. 
6
 The system of fiscal farms of the Ottoman Empire had the same effect. These fiscal farms (Iltizam), held for a 
short period, incited the owners to overexploit the peasants and ruin local agriculture. 
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institutional system for production. The economic superiority of one civilisation over another 
is relative. By inventing capitalism, Europe discovered a more efficient means of controlling 
predators and gave itself the means to finance a powerful army that can itself engage in the 
resulting spoils. The logic of Arab Muslim believers versus non-believers is the story of a 
government model that suffocates entrepreneurial initiative, flatters predators‟ egos, and 
exhausts itself in military expansion, thereby limiting its survival conditions once another area 
discovers a more efficient institutional system, or succeeds better than do others at fighting 
parasitism and inciting cooperation (Zywicki, 2000, p. 87). 
 
Islamic law derives its interpretation from the sacred texts of Islam, which do not predispose 
Muslim civilisation to discover (Facchini, 2010) or adopt free market institutions (Section 2). 
This created a culture unfavourable to economic freedom, which explains why in general the 
Muslim world is less free. The failures of liberalisation in Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s 
can also be explained by the characteristics of the cultural prerequisites. The experiences of 
these two countries demonstrate how difficult it is to create and sustain functioning market 
economies after long periods of étatisme (Chaudhry, 1994, p. 2). 
 
3 Why are some Muslim Countries Fairly Free? 
 
Nevertheless, some countries in the Muslim world are fairly free (Table 3, column 1) based on 
the level of economic freedom, which depends on the size of the state and amount of tax. 
When there is a 'rentier state' the size of the state and amount of tax are low and thereby the 
level of economic freedom is artificially high (3.1). Contemporary history may also explain 
these evolutions. The institutional design in Muslim countries is the result of colonial 
heritages (3.2) and political conflicts (3.3) (Shirley, 2004, pp. 616–629). 
 
3.1 “Rentier State” and Economic Freedom 
 
Many states in Muslim countries are rentier states in that they receive substantial rents from 
foreign individuals, concerns, or governments (Ross, 2001, p. 329). Countries that export oil, 
minerals, and/or workers are described as rentier states. Their public finances are sustainable 
without tax. Countries in the Persian Gulf have no fiscal system and their state sizes are small 
(Table 3). They are not free in terms of investment freedom, financial freedom, and ownership 
(Table 3, columns 1–5 and 10) and corruption is widespread. Many states with great mineral 
wealth and oil also have a large Muslim population in the Middle East, in parts of Asia 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei) and in Africa (Nigeria). This list of oil-producing countries also 
includes Libya and Algeria in North Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei in South Asia, 
Nigeria in Africa, and four republics of the former Soviet Union: Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The economy of Tajikistan strongly depends on the production 
of aluminium and cotton. The economy of Turkmenistan is based on the export of natural gas. 
The main wealth of Azerbaijan is oil. Uzbekistan has significant potential in the fields of oil, 
gas, and gold and is the world's largest producer of cotton. Many states in the Muslim world 
also have a high level of immigration and remittances. Workers‟ remittances have also been 
an important source of foreign exchange in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, 
and Morocco (Ross, 2001, p. 329) as well as in Mali and Senegal. Djibouti is a rentier state 
without oil. Its main source is income transfers from France and the USA for their military 
bases. The situation is similar in Egypt and Jordan, which are largely dependent on American 
aid. The US pays for military locations in these countries because of Israeli–Palestinian 
conflict. Somalia and Sudan are suffering from civil war, while the economy of Niger 
depends on uranium prices. Overall, Muslim countries are generally rentier states. 
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Table 3 shows that the indicators of economic freedom in Muslim countries are much higher 
when governments do not raise taxes and have small-sized states. Gulf countries, in particular, 
display rent-seeking models (usually based around oil) (Al Jabri, 2007, Facchini, 2007). For 
these reasons, the level of economic freedom is not only the result of cultural prerequisites 
(religious factor) or political choices. It can also be explained by geographical determinants 
and the structure of economic sectors. 
 
Table 3 
Breakdown of Indicators of Economic Freedom for Muslim Countries by Region (2009) 
Countries 2009 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Overall 58.7 59.7 69.5 82.5 74.5 72.9 39.5 41.0 32.0 30.2 59.5 
Arabs 58.7 63.4 69.8 86.3 70.1 73.4 43.9 45.0 38.1 36.6 60.3 
Arabian 
Peninsula 
65.6 71.1 80.7 97.3 70.0 69.9 47.1 52.9 45.7 45.1 76.1 
Magreb and 
Marrakesh 
54.5 59.9 64.0 79.6 69.1 74.9 42.5 39.2 32.9 30.7 52.5 
Black Africa 52.1 46.8 65.2 72.0 78.2 75.4 40.0 37.8 26.7 23.8 54.7 
Ex Communist 55.4 60.1 78.2 89.1 79.3 68.5 36.7 38.3 23.3 21.5 59.6 
Asia 55.6 63.2 65.1 78.4 88.6 72.8 32.5 35.0 33.8 29.5 57.3 
Iran 44.6 60.6 57.4 81.0 79.7 60.1 10 10 10 25 52.4 
Turkey 61.6 69.9 86.6 73.2 83.4 71.1 50 50 50 41 40.3 
Sources: www.heritage.org, author‟s calculation of averages: 1 Business Freedom; 2 Trade Freedom; 3 Fiscal 
Freedom; 4 Government Freedom (size of government); 5 Monetary Freedom; 6 Investment Freedom; 7 
Financial Freedom; 8 Property Freedom; 9 Freedom from corruption; and 10 Labour Freedom. 
 
3.2 Colonial Heritage and Institutional Design 
 
The past concerns not only Islamic law and a rent-seeking model, but also European 
colonisation. Like most countries, Muslim countries received their basic legal structures 
involuntarily through conquest and European colonisation. Just as Arab conquests 
transplanted the pre-Islamic law culture into non-Arab countries (Senegal, Indonesia, Turkey), 
European conquests imported European legal traditions such as common law and civil law. In 
addition to common law and French civil law, three legal traditions play some role in parts of 
the world: German code, socialist law, and indigenous Nordic or Scandinavian legal traditions 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, Botero et al. 2004, p. 1345). 
According to Mulligan and Shleifer (2005), Muslim countries inherited their broad legal 
traditions from their colonisers. They accepted path dependency, because it was an efficient 
adaptation. Path dependency is a means to minimising the cost of the enforcement of laws in 
order to protect the value of human capital and coordinate with the old coloniser. The 
evolution of institutions in the Muslim world began with the decline of the Turkish Empire 
and colonisation mainly by the French and British. This shows both the importance of 
institutional competition in institutional design and the role of colonisation (violence). 
 
3.2.1 Decline of the Turkish Empire 
 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Ottoman authorities and the colonising 
Europeans conceived Islam to be an obstacle to economic development and the adoption of 
capitalism. For this reason, they tried to modernise Muslim law and practices. For Khadduri 
(1946), the Turkish defeat by the Russians in 1774 was at the origin of plans to introduce 
Western concepts into these institutions. This would later (1839–1856, Tanzimat) lead onto 
the Sultan instituting the equality of rights for Muslims and Christians and the creation of civil 
courts. These measures were, however, never supported by religious authorities. They 
announced liberal reforms in 1909–1918 and later, through the actions of Mustafa Kemal 
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Atatürk, went as far as to impose Western-style suits for men (law of 1925) (Kuran, 1997b, p. 
315) and to adopt the civil code. The Turks during this period tried to modernise law and 
morality in their country. We can suppose then that the Turkish presence was rather 
favourable towards liberalisation. 
 
Iran chose the same strategy of modernisation from 1906 to 1979. In 1935, it banned the veil 
for women and forced men to wear Western clothes. This choice was, nevertheless, 
constrained by the coloniser. This is a good example of foreign-introduced exogenous 
institutions (Boettke, Coyne and Leeson, 2008, p. 342), when “the distance between the 
process of institutional design and the location of hoped institutional “take-hold” is 
considerable”. This explains the failure of these reforms in Iran. On the contrary, Turkey is an 
example of indigenously introduced endogenous institutions (Boettke, Coyne and Leeson, 
2008, p. 337), which has been more successful. 
 
3.2.2 British and French colonisation 
 
The judicial traditions of the colonists also play a role. For instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) considered the Islamic past less important than was the 
influence of Western colonialism. They place legal system into four Western-centric families: 
English common law or the French, German, or Scandinavian commercial codes. In their 
sample, the legal origin of Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan is English common law. The legal 
origin of Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and Turkey is the French commercial code. The history of 
the economic models of Muslim countries is, under these conditions, a story of restricted 
institutional choices. Furthermore, the Russians invented a new economic model and 
introduced Soviet law in 1917. Behind these five traditions, five economic models formed, 
namely Anglo-Saxon, French, German, and Scandinavian capitalism and the Soviet model. 
The ideal of a Westernised Muslim city in a liberalist or socialist sense can then only inflect 
the relationship that could exist between Muslim law, based on the interpretation of the sacred 
texts, and today‟s law. This inflexion, imposed or chosen, explains, in the framework of the 
institutional dependence path theory, why some countries are more liberal than others are. 
Globally it is accepted that British colonisation bequeathed a more liberal judicial tradition 
than the French, Spanish, and Russian (Soviet) continental traditions (Scully, 1987, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, North, 1990, Shirley, 2004, pp. 617–618). 
Spain transplanted its centralised government and hegemonic property rights developed by the 
nobility to its colonies in Latin America. England brought its decentralised, limited 
government to its colonies. As a result, the United States and Canada were better positioned to 
create good institutions for development than were Latin American countries (Shirley, 2004, 
p. 617). 
 
For Muslim countries, British colonisation explains the high economic freedom in the Persian 
Gulf, namely in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia (Table 4). 
Jordan is no exception. Countries occupied by France are generally classed among the 
countries that are less free (Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Algeria, Djibouti, Mauritania, Niger, 
Syria, Chad, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco). Nevertheless, countries colonised by the 
British are not always carriers of high economic freedom (see Pakistan, Sierra Leone, 
Bangladesh, and Nigeria). Therefore, other factors exist to explain the institutional design. 
The choice of political elite at the time of independence can also explain these differences. 
The choice of institutions – during a time of independence as determined by the Cold War and 
the opposition between two models –was between capitalism and Soviet socialism. In this 
period, the ideals of the Islamic city were compared with foreign models. It should be said 
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that Islam was compatible with liberal capitalism or socialism. The issue is the doctrinal 
translation of institution competition between capitalism and socialism. 
 
Table 4 
Economic Freedom 2009, Western Empires and Muslim Countries 
British Empire
7
 French Empire
8
 Soviet Empire
9
 
Average 
(total) 
Average 
Muslim 
Countries 
Average 
Non-
Muslim 
Countries 
Average 
(total) 
Average 
Muslim 
Countries 
Average 
Non-
Muslim 
Countries 
Average 
(total) 
Average 
Muslim 
Countries 
Average 
Non-
Muslim 
Countries 
60.57 60.75 60.59 53.68 53.85 53.73 58.76 54.86 61.35 
Source: Economic Freedom index, www.heritage.org report 2009 
 
Thus, three major events explain the link between Muslim countries and liberal capitalism in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the institution competition between the Ottoman 
Empire and Europe, colonisation, and the choice of economic model after independence. 
These choices explain the various levels of economic liberalism among Muslim countries as 
well as the existence of different institutional trajectories and the singularity of each country 
(Table 5). 
 
3.3 The fall of the Berlin Wall 
 
After the Second World War, a political leader could choose socialism. With the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet model, this choice created prohibitive justification 
costs for the political elite. The collapse of the Soviet model changed the ideological context 
and this explains why people and political entrepreneurs could no longer believe in real 
socialism. No alternative existed. Choosing the status quo in these circumstances was a 
decision contrary to the sense of history and expectations of people. The market transition was 
almost obvious. Rich countries provided financial assistance to countries formally under 
Soviet influence. 
 
Therefore, the political image in 1991 was different from that prevailing in 1950 when many 
countries gained independence. In this context, we must explain the score of economic 
freedom in Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, and Kazakhstan (moderately free, Table 5) and in 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (not very free or not free). At this step 
of reasoning, Islamic law (legal theory, beliefs, and norms) is just one factor among others to 
explain their scores for economic freedom. The colonisation heritage, political choices after 
the Second World War, and the fall of the Berlin Wall dominated religious factors to explain 
economic freedom in the past century. These evolutions explain why Islamic principles are 
not consistently applied in contemporary Islamic societies (Hillman, 2007, 270)
10
. 
                                                 
7
 Botswana, South Africa, Uganda, Namibia, Swaziland, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia, Gambia, Nigeria, 
Malawi, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Fiji, Samoa, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, India, Tonga, Micronesia, Maldives, Bangladesh, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Burma, Bahrain, Oman, 
Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, UAE, Yemen, Guyana, Belize, Barbados, Bahamas, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (46 countries). 
8
 Egypt, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Djibouti, Chad, Comoros, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Guinea, 
Lebanon, Madagascar, Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Togo, Central African Republic, Rep of Congo, 
Vanuatu, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos (25 countries). 
9
 Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Russia, Ukraine (15 countries). 
10
 This fact is also noted by Bin (2008, p. 15) regarding tax policy in Algeria. He cites note 26 of the thesis of 
Bouderbala, M.A. (2000), La réforme fiscale en Algérie, Thèse Paris 1, 2000, $ 3 et 4, pp. 8–11. 
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Table 5 
Path Dependency 
Countries Pre-Islamic Islam Ottoman Colonisation Independence 
1 Bahrain 74.8* Sassanid–Iranian Empire Arab–7th c. yes British 1971 
2 Oman 67.0 Sassanid–Iranian Empire Arab–7th c. 1507 Portugal British 1980 
3 Qatar 65.8 Sassanid–Iranian Empire Arab–7th c. yes (1872) British 1971 
4 Kuwait 65.6 Sassanid–Iranian Empire Arab–7th c. yes British 1961 
5 UAE 64.7 Sassanid–Iranian Empire Arab–7th c. yes British 1971 
6 Saudi Arabia 64.3 Sassanid–Iranian Empire Arab–7th c. yes British 1932 
7 Jordan 65.4 Sassanid–
Byzantium 
Empire Arab–7th c. yes  
(16th–19th c.) 
British 1946 
8 Turkey 61.6 Sassanid–
Byzantium 
Mercenaries of 
Abassid Caliphs 
yes XV°-1912 No 1992 
9 Malaysia 64.6 Malacca Buddhist 1414 via China no The Netherlands/RU 1957 
10 Albania 63.7 Byzantium–
Christian 
Ottoman–15th c. yes No 1991 
10 Kyrgyz Repub. 
61.8 
Mongol Mongol–13th c. no Russia 1876–Soviet 1991 
11 Kazakhstan 60.1 Mongol Mongol–13th c. no Russia–Soviet 1991 
12 Burkina Faso 59.5 Ghana Empire via Mali Empire no French 1958 
13 Egypt 58.0 Byzantium–
Christian 
Empire Arab–639 yes British–French 1922 
14 Lebanon 58.1 Byzantium–
Christian 
Empire Arab–637 yes French 1946 
15 Tunisia 58.0 Byzantium–
Christian 
Empire Arab–8th c. yes French 1956 
16 Azerbaijan 58.0 Byzantium–
Christian 
667 yes Soviet 1991 
17 Morocco 57.7 Byzantium–
Christian 
Empire Arab–7th c.  no French 1956 
18 Pakistan 57.0 Sassanid–Iranian 10th c. no British 1947 
19 Yemen 56.9 Sassanid–Iranian Empire Arab–7th c. yes Soviet–British 1969 
20 Algeria 56.6 Byzantium–
Christian 
Empire Arab–8th c. yes French (1830) 1962 
21 Senegal 56.3 Songhai Empire 1050 Mali Empire no French 1960 
22 Gambia 55.8 Songhai Empire 1050 Mali Empire no British 1960 
23 Mali 55.6 Ghana Empire 
(750–1240) 
1050 Mali Empire no French 1960 
24 Nigeria 55.1 Songhai Empire 10th c. (Arab 
Merchant) 
no British 1954 
25 Tajikistan 54.6 Kouchan Empire 8th c. no, Russia Soviet 1991 
26 Mauritania 53.9 Ghana Empire 
(750–1240) 
7th c. no French 1960 
27 Niger 53.8 Songhai Empire 1010 Mali Empire no French 1958 
28 Indonesia 53.4 Hindus-Buddhist 15th–16th c. no Netherlands/Japan 1945 
29 Djibouti 53.1    French 1977 
30 Guinea Ghana Empire 
(750-1240) 
10th c. no French 1958 
31 Syria 51.3 Byzantium–
Christian 
636 yes (1516) French 1946 
32 Maldives 51.3  1153 Sultana no British 1965 
33 Uzbekistan 50.5 Sassanid–Iranian 712 no, Mongol Soviet 1991 
34 Sierra Leone 47.8  10th c. no British 1961 
35 Bangladesh 47.5 Dynasty Buddhist 12th c. (soufi) no India–British 1971 
36 Chad 47.5 Kingdom of 
Kanem 
1085  no French 1958 
37 Guinea-Bissau 
45.4 
Ghana Empire 1050 Mali Empire no Portugal 1974 
38 Iran 44.6 Sassanids 7th c. (637) yes British–USA  
39 Libya 43.5 Byzantium–
Christian 
Empire Arab – 632–
661 
yes Italy 1951 
40 Comoros 43.3 Asian–African 1676 Sultana no French 1974 
41 Iraq n/a Byzantium–
Christian 
Empire Arab–7th c. 1534 British 1932 
42 Sudan n/a Christian (I°) 640 no British 1956 
43 Afghanistan n/a Sassanid–Iranian 8th c. no Soviet 1992–1996 
44 Somalia n/a Ethiopian Empire 13th c. Sultana no Italy 1941 
Sources: World Christian Encyclopedia, Economic Freedom index, www.heritage.org report 
2009.  
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In these conditions, the institutional path dependency of Muslim countries is modified by 
colonisation, the choices of independence in the context of the Cold War, and the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, i.e., the failure of the Soviet economic model. It is, in this context, that we must 
understand the movement of liberalisation initiated in the 1990s under the influence of the 
International Monetary Fund. The contemporary evolutions show, nevertheless, that 
liberalisation is instable. There is a revival of Islam, a movement towards socialisation in the 
most liberal countries in the Muslim world, the development of Islamic finance, and the 
hostility of Muslim people in general at free market institutions. The instability of 
liberalisation is the topic of the last section. 
 
4 The Revival of Islam and Institutional Choices in Muslim Countries 
 
Liberalisation or socialisation is an institutional change. Institutional change is a political 
process of mobilising campaigns to legitimate an institutional innovation. The legitimacy 
refers “to the voluntary acceptance of political authority on the part those who are ruled” 
(Gallarotti, 1989, note 10). It is a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Schumann, 1995, p. 574). Institutional change is generated 
by a situation where an agent‟s beliefs on the ways a game is played are altered critically 
(Aoki, 2001, p. 231). The generative mechanism of this change is a problem, namely either 
inefficiency or injustice. North (1981) proposes that the choice of institutions is dictated by 
efficiency considerations. Efficiency considerations, nevertheless, are institutionally 
embedded. Efficiency is the norm. It is a social construction. It is legitimate or not. Islam in 
Muslim countries is the dominant organised belief structure. Islam specifies norms of 
legitimacy and the learning process by which such a belief structure evolves. Islam is the 
main ideology in the Muslim world. Ideology provides integrated explanations of the past and 
present. It is coloured by normative views of how the world should be organised (North, 
1990, note 23). Ideological entrepreneurs, in this context, mobilise these cultural and 
linguistic materials to theorise change and invent the institutional future. 
 
The problems in the Muslim world are numerous: poverty, low education, unemployment, 
inequality, lack of health policy, low purchasing power, and so on. Muslim countries 
constitute a sizeable number of underdeveloped countries. Given these social and economic 
difficulties, people draw on their imaginations to look into the future. The ideological 
entrepreneur generates a process of the institutionalisation of new ideas. This incarnates 
change. It justifies the change and legitimates it in an institutionally embedded framework, i.e. 
Islam. In this context, the legitimacy of reforms is based on religious grounds. The revival of 
Islam translates into both innovation and intense intellectual debate. The institutional change 
must be legitimate, and to have this quality ideological entrepreneurs change the common 
interpretations of the sacred texts and words of God. Institutional change is associated with 
hermeneutic innovations that prepare the institutionalisation of new ideas and the 
deinstitutionalisation of old ideas. An institution is, for this reason, the result of a process of 
the institutionalisation of an idea. An institutional system translates an ideological 
consistency. The future institution in the Muslim world will be, from this perspective, the 
result of the process that assumes collective action, diffusion, and enforcement. The ideal of a 
free market is not shared by many Europeans. It is also opposed by many Muslims who try to 
resolve inconsistencies and cognitive dissonance from colonisation through the formation of a 
development model that is not secular but Islamic. This model will be more in agreement with 
the 'natural' institutional path dependency of the Muslim world, i.e., its embedded framework. 
For these reasons, it is vital to understand and expect the institutional future of the Muslim 
 16 
world to describe its institutional world possibilities and the trends of socialisation, Islamic 
finance, and hostility at free market institutions.  
 
4.1 The Revival of Islam and Definition of Institutional World Possibilities 
 
The question of the institutional adaptation of Muslim countries to European modernity is not 
new. It gave birth to the forced secularisation policies of Reza Shah in Iran and Atatürk in 
Turkey, to the Islam political party in India (Jama’ati Islam) (Kuran, 1997b, p. 304), and to 
Westernisation without renouncement of Islam in Pakistan. It is today the origin of multiple 
economic doctrines that rival each other in directing future reforms. Modern Islam is the offer 
of ideology produced by ideological entrepreneurs for political entrepreneurs. 
 
As stated in the introduction, dependence on the past does not only affect the cost of 
institutional change; it also has an effect on the imagination, the definition of a world of 
institutional possibilities. All the ideals in Muslim countries are inspired by Shari’a, by an 
idealised past, a story that becomes utopia. Most debates within Muslim countries refer to 
what is said by or supposed to be said by Islam on market, democracy, or European 
modernity. 
 
Without surveying all viewpoints, we can nevertheless see that the political and intellectual 
elite of Muslim countries propose different diagnoses but all are focused around the religious 
question. We can cite the Islamic libertarianism of the Minaret of Freedom Institute
11
, 
moderate Islam, modern radical Islam of Muslim Brothers, Saudi wahhabites, or the Iranian 
revolution. 
Libertarian Islamics uphold that the Koran is profoundly liberal. Several Sura and 
verses are mobilised to show this. The Koran forbids any forced imposition of Islam (Sura 2, 
v. 256)
12
, condemns all religious intolerance (Sura 10, v. 108), blesses private property (Sura 
2, v. 188)
13
, insists upon the respect of commitments (Sura 2, v. 177 and Sura 5, v. 1), and 
proposes a number of rules of commercial law (Sura 2, v. 282–283). The decline of the 
Muslim area is explained by state control, which was devoted to the model of the government 
of the first Caliphate. In fact, it could have been the European countries that inherited Muslim 
liberalism via the theologians of the school of Salamanque in Spain in the sixteenth century. 
There would not, in this sense, be the Muslim world and the West; rather, the two worlds 
would be one, sharing the same liberal ideals. 
Moderate Islam considers that the work of interpreting the sacred texts should be 
reopened in order to not enclose Islam in laws that are not adapted to the modernity of 
Muslim countries today. This means adapting Islam to the West‟s financial practices. 
Modern radical Islam proposes, on the contrary, adapting the West‟s financial 
practices to Islam. This originates from the creation of the group of Egyptian Muslim brothers 
created in 1928 by Hasan al Banna (Carré, 1983), in the wahhabism proselytes of Saudi 
Arabia, and in the reflections that led to the Iranian revolution of 1979. It was prepared by 
intellectual and political groups in countries such as Iran, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi 
Arabia, who created references common to the Muslim elite who had initially ignored the 
message of radical modern Islam (Bouba Nouhou, 2005, p. 151). The starting point is that the 
decline of the Muslim world is explained by Muslims‟ bad observance of the Koranic 
                                                 
11
 The President of Minaret of Freedom Institute is an American, Dean Ahmad. He tries through this 
organisation to diffuse liberal ideas in the Muslim world. 
12
 Le Coran, Les éditions du Jaguar, p. 53. 
13
 “Do not rob each other unjustly of your goods, using them then to corrupt judges and seizing cynically a good 
part of others’ goods by this infamous method” (Le Coran, édition du Jaguar, p. 37, translation by the author). 
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precepts. The error of the independent elite is to have sought in the West economic and 
political solutions to the problems of Muslim countries. All these groups preach a return to 
Shari’a for this reason, the ideal of the Muslim city. They divide after that on what means 
should be used to attain this objective. Conservative Islam rejects the West and wishes to 
defend the patriarchal model of traditional Islam based on community values, authority, and 
stability. Reformist Islam wishes, rather, to reaffirm the modernisation of faith together with 
Westernism. This final point is at the origin of the development of an Islamic economic 
theory and is capable of inspiring an alternative development model (Kuran, 1997b, p. 315). 
“A complementary objective of Islamic fundamentalism has been to weaken the prevailing 
commercial and industrial ties between the Muslim world and the West, in order to protect 
Muslims from un-Islamic influences” (Kuran, 1996, p. 439, Hillman, 2007, p. 274). 
 
Whatever the vision of the ideal Muslim city, the intellectual Muslim proposes legitimate 
ideological innovation because this is in agreement with the Prophet‟s word. These 
innovations use the imaginary perfect Muslim city to convince that they are well founded. The 
reforms are brought about by ideological entrepreneurs, who perceive personal gain 
(notoriety, reputation) in the diffusion of the idea and the means of being in agreement with 
their concept of good (axiological rationality). Their ideas – once taken up by a political 
leader and/or the people – are at the origin of institutional change. The idea is the seed of 
change. It is embodied in men, choices, and institutions. The dependence path does not 
produce only the status quo. It also brings to light human dependence on the world of 
possibilities. The invention of a new Muslim city built upon the idealisation of the past brings 
this theory out perfectly. The most influential model is that of fundamentalist or reformist 
Islam. Their innovations modified profoundly the world of institutional possibilities of most 
countries in the Muslim world. They make fiction (ideal Muslim city) a reality. They are 
incarnated in political movements, in people, and in political leaders. They spread and 
progress in the minds of the political elite, the people, and the judges. 
 
4.2 Institutional Future in Muslim Countries and Possible Institutional World 
 
This predominance in the institutional imagination of the ideal of the Muslim city explains the 
instability of economic liberalism in the Muslim world. It is not because the Gulf countries 
are freer today than they will be tomorrow. Several facts sustain the thesis of the 
unsustainability of economic liberalism in the Muslim world: the movement towards 
socialisation in the most liberal countries (4.2.1), the development of Islamic finance (4.2.2), 
and the hostility of Muslim people towards free market institutions (4.2.3). Table 6 presents 
the evolution of economic freedom in Muslim countries (1995–2007). It shows that the 
countries of the ex-Soviet Empire have liberalised the most during the past twelve years. 
Table 6 also gives the results of Pitlik (2008, p. 274) and Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe 
(1999). There is a dependence effect. The more liberal countries are those that liberalise the 
least. We propose two explanations: the cost of liberalisation and the development of Islamic 
finance. 
 
4.2.1 The cost of liberalisation 
 
This effect can be explained by the choices of political entrepreneurs. A state that liberalises 
loses its power over trade and its capacity to purchase its legitimacy. The opportunity cost of 
the liberalisation of the economy for the elite in power is weaker in an economy where 
economic freedom is weaker than it is in a country that has started to make reforms in favour 
of a free market. Liberalisation in the initial phase cannot touch the interests of the political 
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and administrative elite. It is when liberalisation begins to affect more than peripheral public 
income that it becomes costly for the predator and the reformer (political entrepreneur). 
 
Table 6 
Evolution of Economic Freedom in Muslim Countries (1995–2007) 
Liberalisation  Status quo Socialisation 
Uzbekistan +65% (52.3) 
Kazakhstan +42% (60.5) 
Tajikistan +31% (54.5) 
Albania +26% (63.3) 
Turkmenistan +23% (43.4) 
Kyrgyz Republic +16% (61.1) 
Bangladesh +24% (44.9) 
Iran +22% (44.0), Egypt +20% 
(59.2) 
Libya +17% (38.7), Syria +14% 
(46.6) 
 
Nigeria +18% (55.5), Mauritania 
+18% (55.0), Niger +16% (52.7) 
Chad +11% (47.7) 
Burkina Faso +11% (55.6) 
Gambia +8% (56.6) 
Yemen 7% (52.8) 
Mali 4% (55.5) 
Pakistan 2% 
(56.8) 
Qatar 1% (62.2) 
Kuwait 1% (68.3) 
Jordan 1% (63) 
Senegal 0% 
(58.2) 
Turkey 0% (59.3) 
Algeria (-1%) 
(55.7) 
Djibouti (-2%) 
(52.3) 
Indonesia  
(-2%) (53.9) 
 
UAE (-12%) (62.8) 
Malaysia (-10%) (64.5) 
Saudi Arabia (-10%) (62.8) 
Morocco (-9%) (56.4) 
Guinea (-8%) (52.8) 
Bahrain (-7%) (72.2) 
Tunisia (-6%) (59.3) 
Oman (-6%) (67.4) 
Sierra Leone (-6%) (48.9) 
Lebanon (-3%) (60.9) 
Source: Economic Freedom, www.heritage.org: United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Saudi 
Arabia, Morocco, Guinea, Bahrain, Tunisia, Oman, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Turkey, Senegal, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Pakistan, Mali, Yemen, Gambia, Chad, 
Burkina Faso, Syria, Niger, Kyrgyz Republic, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, 
Turkmenistan, Bangladesh, Albania, Tajikistan, Guinea Bissau, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. 
 
Figure 2 
Average Economic Freedom and Growth Economic Freedom 
1995 - 2007
R2 = 0,4391
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4.2.2 Development of Islamic finance 
 
One of the innovations of modern Muslim radicalism is to propose an economic model as an 
alternative to capitalism (Kuran, 1997b, 2005). The return of Shari’a does not only mean a 
return to Muslim penal law. It also means the implementation of Islamic finance (Martens, 
2001). Islamic finance requires that lenders and borrowers of capital do not define interest 
(prohibition of usury or riba), share profits and losses, do not speculate (prohibition of 
incertitude, gharar), rely on real goods or adjacent assets, and do not finance illicit goods 
such as alcohol, tobacco, gambling, or arms (Martens, 2001, p. 10, Kuran 1997b, 2009, El 
Qorchi, 2005, p. 47). 
 
Without this being generalised yet, we observe that Islamic financial activity is growing 
strongly (El Qorchi, 2005, Silva, 2006). Islamic finance is developing at a remarkable pace 
(El Qorchi, 2005, p. 46), although cross-border data remain scarce. According to The Banker 
(05/11/2007), only 42.1% of banks operating in this market publish data on their Islamic 
activities. Therefore, the data underestimate the weight of Islamic finance. Estimates of the 
total size of assets held internationally under Islamic finance vary, ranging upwards from 
$800 billion and with growth rates of 10% to 15% annually over the past ten years (Oakley, 
Bond, O‟Murchu and Jones, 2008). Islamic financial institutions developed initially in 
Malaysia in the 1930s, then in Pakistan in the 1950s and in Egypt in the 1960s (Ariff, 1988). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, two countries officially introduced a large-scale practice of 
Islamic finance: Iran and Pakistan (Martens, 2001, p. 2). Nevertheless, Islamic finance is 
concentrated in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have led to 
the creation respectively of 25% and 23% of Islamic products. If we take just the Islamic 
obligation (sukuk al ijara
14
) their evolution is very quick. 
 
4.2.3 Hostility of Muslims towards free market institutions 
 
The progress of radical modern Islam and the millennium practices of classical Muslim law 
translate concretely into Muslim opinion. Globally, Muslims are hostile to capitalist 
institutions. Under the hypothesis of the Austrian transition theory, this opposition to the 
values of freedom threatens the tenability and durability of economic freedom in Muslim 
countries. It makes the arrival of an Islamic economy credible, an alternative to capitalism 
inspired by the Koran. Surveys carried out on Muslim beliefs attest to this evolution. They 
show that Muslims are generally unfavourable to the values of free enterprise economies 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2003, Zingales, 2004, Rajan and Zingales, 2004, Crosette, 
2000, Inglehart, 2007). Here, we present only the information that enables us to compare 
Muslim law with Muslim economic beliefs. We observe that Muslims remain hostile to 
equality between men and women in the employment market, to competition, and private 
property. By contrast, they are more favourable to the redistribution of wealth. This 
corresponds to the ancestral judicial restrictions of Muslim law on private property and 
individual freedom as described in the first section (Facchini, 2010). 
  
Muslim law does not guarantee strict equality between men and women. It does not give the 
same rights to men and to women. Surveys show that despite the evolution of law in Muslim 
countries, mentalities remain attached to these unequal principles. All religions seem rather 
hostile to women working, but Muslims seem most opposed to this idea (Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales, 2003, p. 228). 
                                                 
14
 Sukuk essentially amounts to commercial paper that provides the subscriber with ownership in the underlying 
asset, namely an asset-backed note. 
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Inglehart (2007) observed that greater inequality between men and women exists in Islamic 
societies compared with other societies (especially educational levels) and that this has 
created a culture of domination, intolerance, and social dependence (Inglehart, 2007, p. 14). 
Inglehart and Norris (2003)
15
 found that Finland, Sweden, Germany, Canada, and Norway 
were most favourable to equality between men and women, while Morocco, Egypt, 
Bangladesh, and Jordan were those countries where inequality was most accepted. For them, 
religion, and particularly Islam, is the main obstacle to women‟s emancipation. This result 
also concurs with the survey of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, which 
showed that in more than half of the Muslim countries surveyed individuals feel that women 
have no place other than for domestic work( Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press, 2003, p. 42). Muslim societies also appear systematically less favourable to women‟s 
rights in objective socioeconomic indicators (education, salaries, responsibility, access to 
contraception, etc.). 
 
Muslims are also hostile to free market institutions, in other words private property, 
competition, and procedural justice. Private property guarantees free entry or the right to be 
competitive. It scrupulously respects the principle of procedural justice. To believe that 
private property is desirable means not fearing competition and not refusing the principles of 
distributive justice. 
 
Generally, believing in God makes one favourable to a free market. Religions differ, however, 
in their attitudes to private property (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003, Zingales, 2004, p. 
59). To the question “In business and industry should private property be favoured?” it is the 
Buddhists, then the Catholics, Protestants, and Hindus who most often answer “yes”. Muslims 
are least favourable to private property. Muslims are also rather hostile to competition and 
have a more pronounced taste than do others for redistribution. This is coherent with their 
hostility to private property and the rent-seeking model. Atheists are most favourable to an 
equality of revenue. Of religious groups, Muslims and Jews are clearly favourable to an 
equality of revenue, while Protestants, Hindus, and Buddhists are more favourable to market 
distribution. 
 
All these facts show that Islam is always present in the institutional imagination of Muslims. 
It plays a role in the institutional choices of Muslim countries, their business practices, and 
their ways to justify their decisions. The hostility of opinion towards the free market ethic and 
the rise of Islamic ethics move Muslim countries away from a free market. Muslims reinforce 
the idea that religious ideology has an effect on institutional choices in the East. It is not, in 
this context, obvious that political elites have an incentive to liberalise their economies and 
protect property rights. The scepticism in the West regarding material progress and economic 
freedom is not in favour of liberalism in the Muslim world, under the principles of 
institutional competition. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This study has enabled us to bring to light the existence of a double institutional dependence 
path of the Muslim world to Islam. It has shown, firstly, that Muslim countries are generally 
not free. We explained this situation using the history of the economic models of the Arab and 
                                                 
15
 The conferences of Vienna (1993), Cairo (1994), and Beijing (1996) recognised the rights of women and 
equality of the sexes. This movement is the result of the rising post-materialist values.  
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Ottoman Empires. This also showed that Muslim countries have been subjected to influences 
other than Islam. The British influence has been good for economic freedom in the Persian 
Gulf. By contrast, the French and Soviet influence has been less favourable to economic 
freedom. These influences explain the Westernisation of the Muslim world. 
 
The effects of Islam have declined in the twentieth century, but the religion's role in the 
institutional imagination of Muslims has not disappeared. It might even succeed in idealising 
the past and restoring to Islam its utopian dimension. The twentieth century was the century 
of Westernisation and, in some countries, of liberalisation. The twenty-first century may 
welcome the inventing of a different economic model of Western liberal capitalism. We 
predict that economic freedom in these countries will decline. The history of the twentieth 
century does not explain the natural trajectory of Muslim countries that are attracted by the 
ideal of the Muslim city (Shari’a, Islamic finance, etc.). Muslim people do not have as an 
ideal the free market. The success of modern radical Islam – in the face of alternatives such as 
a liberal or moderate Islam – weakens the durability and sustainability of liberalisation in this 
civilisation. Economic liberalism is not the ethical road of the Muslim world. This fact also 
predicts that liberalisation would not be an economic success. The cultural prerequisites of 
successful reforms are not met. To succeed, the government should invest in liberal 
propaganda to explain why liberalism and Islam are reconcilable. Liberalisation is not only 
hindered by political barriers. It also depends upon the ethical values of the people and 
political elite. This ethic inspires the world of institutional possibilities and orients their 
choices. Human action is not only a consequence of the environment because it can make 
fiction a reality. Therefore, people‟s institutional imagination is as important as are their 
experiences. 
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